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ABSTRACT
Online micro-blogging services and social networks, as ex-
emplified by Twitter and Facebook, have emerged as an im-
portant means of disseminating information quickly and at
large scale. A standard mechanism in micro-blogging that
allows for interesting content to reach a wider audience is
that of reposting (i.e., retweeting in Twitter, or sharing in
Facebook) of content initially posted by another user. Moti-
vated by recent events in which users were prosecuted merely
for reposting anti-government information, we present Ri-
poste, a randomized reposting scheme that provides pri-
vacy guarantees against such charges.
The idea is that if the user likes a post, Riposte will re-
post it only with some (carefully chosen) probability; and if
the user does not like it, Riposte may still repost it with
a slightly smaller probability. These probabilities are com-
puted for each user as a function of the number of connec-
tions of the user in the network, and the extent to which
the post has already reached those connections. The choice
of these probabilities is based on results for branching pro-
cesses, and ensures that interesting posts (liked by a large
fraction of users) are likely to disseminate widely, whereas
uninteresting posts (or spam) do not spread. Riposte is ex-
ecuted locally at the user, thus the user’s opinion on the post
is not communicated to the micro-blogging server.
We quantify Riposte’s ability to protect users in terms
of differential privacy and provide analytical bounds on the
dissemination of posts. We also report on experimental re-
sults based on topologies of real networks, including Twitter,
Facebook, Renren, Google+ and LiveJournal.
1. INTRODUCTION
Micro-blogging platforms and online social networks
are becoming a main source of news dissemination in
the world. The open nature of such platforms pro-
vides unique opportunities for so-called web activists to
denounce despotic activities and corrupted regimes [1,
15].1 Not surprisingly, secret (and not so secret) police
1http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/
egypt-facebook-revolution-wael-ghonim_n_822078.
html
Figure 1: In Riposte, the user’s opinion is locally ran-
domized, and only the output of Riposte is exposed to
the online service. The ¬Repost arrow is represented
for illustration purposes and is not an explicit action of
Riposte.
services have been carefully following Internet traffic,
and there has been an increasing number of arrests of
such web activists. In many of these cases, people have
been convicted merely for contributing to the dissemi-
nation of a post initially posted by someone else, a.k.a.
reposting the post.2,3
The motivation of this work is to devise a dissemina-
tion protocol for a micro-blogging or other social net-
works that would protect its users from such charges
and hence conviction. Consider, for example, the set-
ting where the content to disseminate is an article or
a video from a media edited in some country X, and a
link to that content was posted to the social network.
We then seek to protect the privacy of an activist who
wishes to contribute to the spread of that post by re-
posting it to her followers/friends in a country Y , e.g.,
retweet it on Tweeter, or share it on Facebook. The
attacker here is any individual/group/external agency
trying to identify the users involved in the spread of a
specific post, by observing the dissemination, or even
accessing the servers of the network.
We present Riposte,4 a privacy-preserving reposting
protocol. Riposte achieves privacy by randomizing the
2http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/11/19/
indian-woman-arrested-over-facebook-like/
3http://www.npr.org/2011/12/01/142998183/
in-south-korea-old-law-leads-to-new-crackdown
4Riposte is the French word for counter-attack.
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user’s repost actions: If a user likes a post, Riposte
will repost it with some (carefully chosen) probabil-
ity; otherwise, Riposte may still repost it, but with
a smaller probability, equally carefully chosen. This de-
cision is made locally, i.e., by Riposte’s code at the
user’s browser, and is not communicated to the central
service (Figure 1). This way, it is ensured that when
an attacker observes a repost action, she cannot know
with certainty whether it reflects the user’s opinion, or
whether Riposte enforced that action, thus providing
plausible deniability to the user.
The main challenge in our approach stems from the
trade-off between guaranteeing privacy on one hand,
and ensuring that the spread of a post reflects the over-
all opinion of users, on the other. The latter means that
posts liked by many users should spread a lot, whereas
non-interesting posts (or spam) should not spread. The
requirement for privacy suggests that the two probabil-
ities Riposte uses to decide for the repost when the
user likes/does not like the post should be close to each
other. Whereas the requirement that the size of dissem-
ination should reflect users’ opinion suggests the oppo-
site: the two probabilities cannot be “too” close to each
other, otherwise the user’s opinion is not taken into ac-
count.
Riposte computes these probabilities, at each user
for each post, based on the number of connections of the
user in the micro-blogging network, and the extend to
which the post has already reached those connections.
Our choice of these probabilities draws from the the-
ory of branching processes [3] and ensures the following
properties.
• Privacy: By observing the reposts of a user, an
attacker cannot tell (with sufficient confidence) if
that user likes the post or not.
• Dissemination: Posts liked by a large fraction of
users are likely to disseminate to a large fraction
of the network, whereas posts that only few people
like (or spam posts) do not spread.
Riposte shall be seen as a novel dissemination scheme
that seeks to protect its users with respect to the privacy
of their repost actions. We should stress that Riposte
diverges from the standard repost practice: A user may
not repost all the content she would like to, and may
repost content she does not like. This change in the dis-
semination semantics is the price to pay for users to see
their privacy preserved. Also, we believe that the so-
cial nature of such platforms can be leveraged by users
themselves. They can use their real relationship with
followers or friends to implement a human filter on the
reposting actions: Alice might realize that the repost-
ing of X does not resemble Bob’s habits and therefore
be the consequence of running Riposte.5 The recent
5Note that such a human filter is first difficult to reproduce
success of social applications such as Snapchat or Whis-
per shows an increased concern of users for privacy and
therefore their willingness to change their habits and
adopt new privacy preserving schemes.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1. We present a simple yet powerful privacy-preserving
reposting protocol, called Riposte.
2. We provide a theoretical analysis of Riposte. We
express the privacy properties of Riposte in terms
of ε-differential privacy [6]. For the dissemina-
tion, we provide analytical bounds on the spread
of posts (under certain modeling assumptions).
3. We complement the analysis by extensive exper-
imental results on real micro-blogging and social
networks topologies, from Twitter, Facebook, Live-
Journal, Google+ and Renren.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we describe Riposte and discuss its properties.
In Section 3 we analyze Riposte’s privacy guarantees.
Section 4 provides an analysis of the dissemination of
posts. In Section 5 we describe our experimental setup
followed by the experimental results in Section 6. Sec-
tion 7 discusses some implementation details. Section 8
gives an overview of related work, and Section 9 con-
cludes the paper.
2. THE RIPOSTE PROTOCOL
In this section we describe Riposte and discuss its
properties.
2.1 Protocol Description
Riposte is a randomized dissemination scheme with
a repost mechanism.We assume that each user in this
system has a set of followers (or friends), and when a
user posts or reposts some content, this content is sent
to all its followers.
Riposte decides for each post the user receives, whe-
ther to repost it or not. This decision is local to the user:
it is made by Riposte’s code at the user’s machine.
Riposte solicits the opinion of the user about the post,
i.e., if the user likes it or not, and then decides whether
or not to repost it. If it decides to repost, then a repost
request is communicated to the system server. We stress
that Riposte does not reveal the user’s opinion on the
post, to the server or to any other user.
Riposte does not repost every post that the user
likes, and it may repost content that the user does not
like. If the user likes a post then it is reposted with some
carefully computed probability; and if the user does not
like it, it is reposted with another carefully chosen prob-
ability, which is slightly smaller. These two probabilities
for an attacker and second can never lead to a clear evidence.
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are computed based on (1) the number of the user’s fol-
lowers that have not received the post yet; and (2) two
global parameters of Riposte, λ and δ, called spread-
ing and blocking factor respectively . These parameters
are fixed and are the same for all users—they are not
chosen by each user. The values of these parameters im-
pact the dissemination of posts, and determine also the
privacy guarantees the protocol provides, as explained
in detail later. Both parameters are real numbers with
0 < δ < 1 and λ > 1.
Riposte decides whether or not to repost as follows:
Consider a user u who receives a new post, and suppose
that s > 0 of its followers have not yet received the
post at the time. If u likes the post, it is reposted with
probability
rlike(s) :=
{
λ/s, if s ≥ λ+ δ,
1− δ(s−δ)λs , if 0 < s < λ+ δ;
while if u does not like the post, it is reposted with
probability
rdis(s) := δ/s.
These random decisions are independent for each user
and for each post.
Remark 1. The second formula for rlike(s), for the case
of small s, will be justified when we analyse the privacy
properties of the protocol, in Section 3. Until then we
can assume the following simpler definition for all s,
rlike(s) := min{λ/s, 1}.
We assume that Riposte knows the number s of fol-
lowers that have not yet received a given post. This
information is available and can be easily obtained in
many existing platforms, including Twitter. Neverthe-
less, at the end of this section we provide a simple vari-
ant of Riposte that uses the total number of followers
in place of s; we show that this variant has very similar
properties as the Riposte protocol presented above.
We give now an informal overview of Riposte’s prop-
erties, and provide some intuitive explanation. The for-
mal analysis will be provided in the next sections. First
we discuss privacy properties, and then the guarantees
provided with respect to the dissemination of posts.
2.2 Privacy Overview
With respect to privacy, our goal is that an attacker,
who observes all the reposts of the users, cannot tell
whether or not a particular user indeed likes a given
post—unless the post originated at that user.6
More specifically, observing that the post was reposted
(or not) from the user, may change only slightly the
6
Riposte does not protect the privacy of the source of a
post. This is a reasonable assumption since a lot of posts
originate from media.
prior knowledge that the attacker has about the user’s
opinion on the post (e.g., by observing previous posts
by that user). In other words, if before having observed
reposting actions, the attacker believed that with prob-
ability q the user likes the post, then learning whether
or not the post was reposted from the user may change
this probability to qˆ, such that this new probability qˆ
will be close to q.
How close these two probabilities are in Riposte de-
pends on the choice of parameters δ and λ. Since rlike(s)
and rdis(s) are respectively (at most) λ/s and δ/s, it is
intuitive that the closer the values of δ and λ, the less
information the attacker gains about the user’s opinion
by observing his reposts, thus the better the privacy
guarantee. Consider, for example, the extreme case in
which δ = 0 and λ = n (n being the size of the net-
work). I.e., every post that the user likes is reposted,
and no other posts are reposted, as, e.g., in Twitter. In
this case, if the post is reposted (resp. not reposted), an
attacker can conclude with certainty that the user likes
it (resp. does not like it). On the other hand, in the
opposite extreme case in which δ = λ = 1, reposting
reveals no information at all. However, choosing δ and
λ to be equal is not very useful, as the dissemination is
then independent of the user’s opinion.
In Section 3, we show that our protocol ensures ǫ-
differential privacy for ǫ = ln(λ/δ). Thus, the closer
the ratio λ/δ to one, the better the achieved privacy.
We will see that if q is the probability for a given user
u to like the post, as perceived by the attacker, and qˆ is
the same probability after observing that the post was
reposted from u then
qˆ =
q
q + (1− q)δ/λ
.
E.g., for typical parameter values, δ = 3/4 and λ = 3,
we have that if q = 0.01 then qˆ ≈ 0.04; if q = 0.1 then
qˆ ≈ 0.3; and if q = 0.9 then qˆ ≈ 0.97.
2.3 Dissemination Overview
With respect to dissemination, our goal is that the
fraction of users reached by a post should reflect the
user’s overall opinion on the post. In particular, we
want that interesting posts, i.e., posts many users like,
to typically spread to a lot of users, while not inter-
esting posts should not reach many users. The main
difficulty in this goal lies in the fact that the users’ opin-
ions on a post are not known in advance, and thus we
cannot tell beforehand if a post is interesting or not. In-
deed Riposte does not rely on any prior knowledge of
how interesting the post may be. Furthermore, we are
constrained by the requirement that the users’ opinions
must remain private.
The idea behind Riposte’s dissemination scheme is
simple, and draws from the theory of branching pro-
cesses [3]. A branching process is a random process
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modeling a population, which starts with one or more
individuals, and at each step a single individual pro-
duces zero of more offsprings and then dies. In the most
basic model, the number of offsprings of an individual
follows a fixed probability distribution that does not
vary between individuals. Let µ be the expected num-
ber of offsprings of an individual. It is a well-known fact
then that if µ < 1 the population dies quickly, while if
µ > 1 it survives forever with some positive probability.
To see the connection of Riposte to branching pro-
cesses, let us compute the expected number of new users
that learn the post from a given user u who has received
the post. Let s > 0 be the number of u’s follower who
have not already received the post from some other user
before u’action is decided.
If u likes the post, then Riposte will repost it with
probability rlike(s), and thus, with this probability, s
new users will learn the post. It follows that rlike(s) · s
users will learn it in expectation. Further, if s ≥ λ+ δ,
then rlike(s) = λ/s and thus rlike(s) · s = λ > 1 new
users receive the post from u in expectation.
By a similar reasoning, if the user does not like the
post, then Riposte forwards it to at most δ < 1 other
users in expectation. Depending now on the popularity
of the post, that is, the fraction of users who like it,7 we
have more than 1 new users in expectation that learn
the post from the average user if the post is sufficiently
popular, or fewer than 1 if the post is less popular. An
analysis then, using standard results from branching
processes, shows that if the expected number of users
to receive the post from the average user is even slightly
larger than 1 then the post is likely to reach a signifi-
cant fraction of the network; while if this expectation is
even slightly smaller than 1 then the post is unlikely to
spread.
More precisely, in Section 4 we prove the following
bounds on dissemination, under some independence as-
sumption on the opinion of different users. For any pa-
rameters 0 < δ < 1 < λ, there is a popularity threshold
p∗ =
1− δ
λ− δ
,
such that:
(a) A post with popularity smaller than p∗ (unpopular
post), spreads to an expected number of users that
is at most a constant factor larger than the number
of followers of the user who sent the original post.
This result holds for any network topology.
(b) A post with popularity greater than p∗ (popular
post), spreads to at least some constant fraction of
the network, with at least a constant probability,
provided that the number of followers of the user
7We stress that the popularity of posts is not known in ad-
vance.
who sent the original post is not much smaller than
the average. This result is shown for a specific ran-
dom graph model for social networks.
2.4 DB-RISPOSTE: Counting All Followers
Riposte needs to know the number of the user’s fol-
lowers who have not yet received the post. In most
platforms, this information is readily available, as the
default setting is that a user can access the list of posts
each of its followers has received. However, followers
may have the option to hide that information.
DB-Riposte (Degree-Based Riposte) is a simple vari-
ant that accounts for these concerns. This protocol is
identical to Riposte, except that in the definition of
probabilities rlike and rdis, we replace the number of
followers s that have not already received the post, by
the total number d of followers.
DB-Riposte provides the same privacy guarantees
as Riposte, and similar dissemination guarantees ex-
cept that the spread achieved for popular posts may be
smaller by some small factor.
We will also provide an analysis and experimental
evaluation of this variant of Riposte.
3. ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY
In this section we show that Riposte is ε-differential-
ly private.
3.1 Differential Privacy
We start by recalling the definition of an ε-differen-
tially private algorithm. Suppose we have a randomized
algorithm A that takes as input a collection ofm values,
x1, . . . , xm from some domain Din, and returns a value
from some domain Dout. We denote by A(x1, . . . , xm)
the output value of the algorithm. Since the algorithm
is randomized, it may give different outputs for the same
input. Thus, for a fixed input x1, . . . , xm, the output
A(x1, . . . , xm) is a random variable, with some distri-
bution over Dout. Suppose now that the input to A
is not known to us (is private), and by observing just
the output of A we want to find out the value of some
of the inputs. More generally, we may have some in-
formation about the input, i.e., a distribution over the
possible combinations of input values, and we want, by
observing A’s output, to improve this information, i.e.,
obtain a distribution that is closer to the true input
values. We can quantify the extend to which this is
possible in terms of ε-differential privacy. Algorithm A
is ε-differentially private if changing exactly one of it in-
puts x1, . . . , xm changes the distribution of the output
only by at most an eε factor.
Definition 1 (ε-differential privacy). A randomized al-
gorithm A with inputs x1, . . . , xm from some finite do-
main Din and output A(x1, . . . , xm) on some domain
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Dout, is ε-differentially private if for any two set of in-
puts x1, . . . , xm and x
′
1, . . . , x
′
m that differ in exactly one
value, and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ Dout,
Pr
(
A(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S
)
≤ eε · Pr
(
A(x′1, . . . x
′
m) ∈ S
)
.
In our setting, algorithm A is the reposting protocol,
which takes a single binary input: the opinion of the
user, and has a binary output: repost or not-repost.
Theorem 1. Both Riposte and DB-Riposte are ε-
differentially private for ε = ln(λ/δ).
Proof. Below we use k to denote the number of followers
of the user considered if DB-Riposte is used, or the
number of followers that have not received the post yet
if Riposte is used.
We must show that (1) the probability of reposting
when the user likes the post is no larger than eε = λ/δ
times the probability of reposting when the user does
not like the post, i.e.,
rlike(k) ≤ (λ/δ) · rdis(k); (1)
and (2) the probability of not reposting when the user
does not like the post is no larger than λ/δ times the
probability of not reposting when the user likes the post,
1− rdis(k) ≤ (λ/δ) · (1− rlike(k)). (2)
Ineq. (1) holds because: rlike(k) = δ/k for all k > 0,
rdis(k) = λ/k if k ≥ λ+ δ, and rdis(k) < λ/k if 0 < k <
λ+ δ. For Ineq. (2), we have for 0 < k < λ+ δ,
(λ/δ) · (1− rlike(k)) = (λ/δ) ·
δ(k − δ)
λk
= 1− rdis(k);
and for k ≥ λ+ δ, we must show
(λ/δ)(1− λ/k) ≥ 1− δ/k
⇔ λ(1− λ/k) ≥ δ(1− δ/k)
⇔ λ− δ ≥ (λ2 − δ2)/k
⇔ 1 ≥ (λ+ δ)/k
⇔ k ≥ λ+ δ,
which holds.
We explain now what this property implies for the
information an attacker can gain for the opinion of a
user, by learning whether or not it reposted a post.
Suppose the attacker has some prior knowledge on
the opinion of the user on the post, i.e., the attacker
believes that with some probability q the user likes the
post. We argue that the new probability qˆ with which
the attacker believes that the user likes the post, after
it has learned whether or not the user has reposted, is
q
q + (1− q)(λ/δ)
≤ qˆ ≤
q
q + (1− q)(δ/λ)
. (3)
Let L be the event that the user likes the post, and R
the binary random variable that is 1 if the user reposts
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Figure 2: Illustration of Ineq. (3) that provides upper
and lower bounds on qˆ in terms of q. Probability qˆ
diverges more from q as λ increases or δ decreases.
and 0 if it does not repost. Then the probabilities q
and qˆ can be expressed as q = Pr(L) and qˆ = Pr(L | R).
Suppose that the user has at least one follower who does
not know the post yet and thus the probability of repost
is not zero. From Bayes’ Rule,
Pr(L | R) =
Pr(R | L) · Pr(L)
Pr(R | L) Pr(L) + Pr(R | ¬L) Pr(¬L)
=
Pr(L)
Pr(L) + Pr(R|¬L)Pr(R|L) · Pr(¬L)
. (4)
Also from Theorem 1, we have δ/λ ≤ Pr(R|¬L)Pr(R|L) ≤ λ/δ.
Applying this to the expression for Pr(L | R) above
proves Ineq. (3).
3.2 Correlated Posts
We have seen that the observance of an individual
post reposted by a user only marginally changes the
attacker’s confidence about the user’s opinion on that
post. However, if a user receives several correlated posts,
e.g., posts supporting a particular anti-government view,
then the reposts by the user can be used to compute an
accurate estimate of whether the user supports the view.
The larger the set of correlated posts, the higher the ac-
curacy of the estimation. In this setting, we argue that
the attacker cannot identify a large set of users such
that with significant probability all the users in the set
support the view.
Suppose there is a set of t posts on some anti-gov-
ernment view. Considering the attacker’s point of view,
we call a user guilty if she likes a post and innocent
otherwise. The goal for the attacker is to identify the
largest subset L of users that like at least one of those
t posts, such that the probability that all users in L are
guilty is at least 1/2. This goal makes sense if, for exam-
ple, the government wants to charge the largest possible
number of users, without charging innocent users. For
simplicity we will assume that each user likes either all
the t posts or none. We also assume that the expected
fraction p of users that like the posts is known, but
no additional information is available in advance about
users. So, we can assume that each user likes the posts
with probability p independently of the other users. We
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are interested in the size ℓ = |L| of L. For simplicity,
we assume DB-Riposte is used, but similar reasoning
applies also to Riposte.
We observe the dissemination of the t anti-government
posts. For a user u with degree d, who has received i of
those posts and has reposted r, the probability of dis-
liking the posts can be computed similar to Equation 4,
which gives the probability for liking, and is given by:
θ(i, r, d) :=
1− p
(1− p) + Pr(B(i,δ/d)=r)Pr(B(i,λ/d)=r) · p
,
where B(i, q) is the binomial distribution counting the
number of successes among i independent trials with
success probability q. Substituting the definition for
the binomial distribution yields:
θ(i, r, d) =
1− p
(1− p) +
(
λ
δ
)r (d−λ
d−δ
)i−r
· p
.
It is easy to verify that the following strategy for choos-
ing the elements of L maximizes the size of L. Let θj
be the value for the j-the user in a list of users with
increasing values of θ. We choose L to be the set con-
taining the first ℓ users in the list, for ℓ the largest index
such that
1−
∏
j≤ℓ
(1− θj) < 1/2.
The quantity on the left is the probability that not all
users like the posts, and is approximately
∑
j≤ℓ θj .
We evaluate ℓ numerically in the following setting.
We assume that the attacker fixes in advance a set of m
users, then each of these users is given all the t posts,
and the attacker must choose a subset L of these m
users after it observes their reposts.
Table 1 shows the average (over 10000 runs) of the
maximum number ℓ of users that can be identified as
guilty. We chose the fraction p of guilty users to be
1%, 10% and 30%, the number of users to be m =
100, 1000, 10000, 100000, and the number of posts to be
t = 5, 10, 20. We assume δ = 0.75, λ = 3 and d = 40.
For example, in a group of 1000 users, 100 of which are
guilty in expectation (p = 10%), and for a set of 10
correlated posts, an attacker can only identify a set of
at most 3 guilty users on average.
As expected, the number of users that can be con-
victed increases with the number of correlated posts, as
the more a user expresses her opinion about a topic,
the easier it becomes to estimate her opinion and hence
convict her. Overall, the number of users that can be
convicted is very small with respect to the number of
guilty users.
4. ANALYSIS OF DISSEMINATION
In this section we provide analytical bounds on the
dissemination of posts using Riposte.
p users guilty
convicted
5 posts 10 posts 20 posts
0.01
100 1 0.0 0.0 0.1
1,000 10 0.0 0.1 0.7
10,000 100 0.0 0.5 1.8
100,000 1,000 0.2 1.5 5.0
0.1
100 10 0.6 1.1 1.8
1,000 100 1.4 3.0 6.5
10,000 1,000 3.5 6.8 19
100,000 10,000 5.3 17 54.1
0.3
100 30 1.9 3.7 6.2
1,000 300 4.9 10.8 21.1
10,000 3,000 12.7 23.3 63.9
100,000 30,000 20.2 63.4 190.9
Table 1: Number of users convicted such that the prob-
ability to convict a innocent user is at most 0.5.
4.1 Preliminaries
Let G denote a directed network of users. A connec-
tion from user u to user v denotes that v follows u. Let
n denote the total number of users.
For the analysis we make the assumption that all
users are equally likely to like a given post, indepen-
dently of their position in the network and the opinion
of other users. Precisely, we assume the following prob-
abilistic uniform opinion model.
Definition 2 (Uniform Opinion Model). In this model,
each post is associated with some probability p, called the
popularity of the post (different posts may have differ-
ent popularity). The probability that any given user u
likes a post is equal to the post’s popularity p, and is
independent of the set of users v 6= u that like the post.
Suppose that user u receives a post of popularity p.
Let s be the number of u’s followers that have not re-
ceived the post yet, and suppose s > 0. If we assume
the uniform opinion model, then u has probability p of
liking the post, and thus the probability of reposting for
Riposte is
p · rlike(s) + (1− p) · rdis(s).
If s ≥ λ + δ then rlike(s) = λ/s and the probability
above is
pλ+ (1− p)δ
s
.
Since s followers of u do not know the post yet, the ex-
pected number of users that will learn the post from u is
pλ+ (1− p)δ
s
· s = pλ+ (1− p)δ.
If this quantity is greater than 1, we say that the post
is popular ; if it is smaller than 1, we say it is unpopular.
The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 3 (Popular/Unpopular posts). For given λ
and δ, we define the popularity threshold
p∗ :=
1− δ
λ− δ
,
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and we call a post popular if its popularity is p > p∗,
and unpopular if p < p∗.8
We define now a simple random network model of a
typical micro-blogging network, in which there is a large
variation in the number of followers between users, while
there is little variation in the number of followees (i.e.,
the users that one user follows). The model takes as a
parameter a distribution φ on the number of followers.
Definition 4 (Gφ network model). Let φ be a probabil-
ity distribution on the integers 0, . . . , n−1. Then Gφ is
an n-user random network constructed as follows. In-
dependently for each user u, we first choose the number
d of followers that u will have, according to distribution
φ; and then we choose d uniformly random users among
all the other users (excluding u) to be u’s followers.
Finally, we note that the probability functions rlike(k)
and rdis(k) have been defined only for k ≥ 1. To sim-
plify notation, we define also rlike(0) = rdis(0) = 0.
4.2 Bounds on Dissemination
We begin with the simple observation that Riposte
achieves at least as large dissemination asDB-Riposte,
in the following sense.
Observation 1. For a network G, consider the spread
of a post when Riposte is used, and the spread of the
same post (originated at the same user) if DB-Riposte
is used instead. We assume that the opinion of each user
is the same in both cases. Let N and Ndb denote the
number of users that receive the post in each case. Then
for any k, the probability that N ≥ k is at least equal
to the probability that Ndb ≥ k.
The reason is that for a user u, the number of fol-
lowers s that have not yet received the post is smaller
or equal to the total number d of u’s followers, and
from this it follows that rlike(s) ≥ rlike(d) and rdis(s) ≥
rdis(s), if s > 0. The complete proof can be found in
the appendix.
Remark 2. From Observation 1 it follows that any up-
per bound on the dissemination that holds for Riposte,
applies also to DB-Riposte; and any lower bound for
DB-Riposte applies also to Riposte.
Next we establish an upper bound on the spread of
unpopular posts, and a lower bound on the spread of
popular posts.
Unpopular posts. We present now an upper bound
on the expected dissemination of unpopular posts. We
show that the expected number of users who receive
a given unpopular post is by at most a constant fac-
tor larger that the number of followers of the user who
8For the asymptotic bounds we show later, we assume for
a popular post that p > p∗ + ǫ, and for an unpopular post
that p < p∗ − ǫ, for some arbitrary small constant ǫ > 0.
started the post. The constant factor depends on the
popularity of the post and parameters δ and λ. This
bound holds for any network G, assuming the uniform
opinion model. Recall that a post is unpopular if its
popularity is smaller than p∗ = (1− δ)/(λ− δ).
Theorem 2 (Upper bound for unpopular posts). For
any G, and under the uniform opinion model, both Ri-
poste and DB-Riposte guarantee that a post with
popularity p < p∗ started by a user with d followers
is received by an expected total number of at most d/β
users, where β = (p∗ − p)(λ− δ).
Observe that as p approaches the popularity thresh-
old p∗, factor β decreases, and thus the bound on the ex-
pected spread increases. Further, substituting the defi-
nition of p∗ gives β = 1−δ−p(λ−δ), which implies that
increasing either λ or δ increases the expected spread.
All these observations are consistent with the intuition.
From Remark 2, it follows that it suffices to prove
the upper bound of Theorem 2 just for Riposte, as
then the same bound holds forDB-Riposte. The proof
for Riposte is a bit technical and can be found in the
appendix. Instead, we provide below a simpler proof
that holds only for DB-Riposte.
Proof of Theorem 2 for DB-Riposte. InDB-Riposte,
the set of all users that receive the post does not de-
pend on the order in which reposts take place. Thus we
can assume that dissemination proceeds in rounds in a
breadth-first manner, as follows: In round 0, the source
user posts the content; then in each round t > 0, every
user that learned the post in the previous round t − 1,
either reposts or decides it will not repost. (We say a
user learns a post the first time it receives it.)
Let Zt, for t ≥ 0, denote the number of users that
learn the post in round t; so Z0 = d. The total number
T of users that learn the post (in any round) is then
T =
∑
t≥0
Zt.
We bound now the expectation of each Zt. The prob-
ability for a user u with k followers to repost when it
receives the post, is
p · rlike(k) + (1− p) · rdis(k) ≤
pλ+ (1− p)δ
k
=
1− β
k
,
where the last equation is obtained using the equations
β = (p∗ − p)(λ− δ) and p∗ = (1− δ)/(λ− δ). Thus the
expected number of users that receive the post from u
is at most
1− β
k
· k = 1− β.
Some of these users may have already received the post
from a different user, in the same or a previous round,
thus 1−β is just an upper bound on the expected num-
ber of users that learn the post from u. Given now the
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number of users that learned the post in round t − 1,
it follows from the linearity of expectation that the ex-
pected number of users that learned the post in round
t is
E[Zt | Zt−1] ≤ Zt−1 · (1− β).
Taking the unconditional expectation on both sides yields
E[Zt] ≤ E[Zt−1] · (1 − β). Applying this inequality it-
eratively and using that E[Z0] = Z0 = d gives
E[Zt] ≤ (1− β)
td.
Since T =
∑
t≥0 Zt, it follows from the linearity of ex-
pectation and the above bound that
E[T ] =
∑
t≥0
E[Zt] ≤
∑
t≥0
(1− β)td = d/β.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2 forDB-Riposte.
Popular posts. Next we study the dissemination of
popular posts on the Gφ network model, for an arbi-
trary distribution φ for the followers (under a mild con-
straint on the min number of followers). We establish a
lower bound on the probability of a popular post to be
received by a constant fraction of users. The probability
and the size of the fraction grow respectively with the
number d of followers of the source, and the popularity
of the post. In particular, the probability converges to
1 for d sufficiently large relative to the average number
of followers.
Theorem 3 (Lower bound for popular posts). Con-
sider the network model Gφ, for a distribution φ such
that the minimum number of followers of any user is at
least λ + δ, and the average number is µ. Let ǫ, ǫ′ > 0
be arbitrary small constants. Suppose that a post with
popularity p ≥ p∗ + ǫ is posted by a random user, and
this user has d followers. Under the uniform opinion
model, both Riposte and DB-Riposte guarantee that
with probability at least 1−e−Ω(d/µ) the total number of
users that receive the post is at least
(1− ǫ′) ·
βn
β + 1
,
where β = (p− p∗)(λ− δ).
Note that the same constant β = |p− p∗| · (λ− δ) ap-
pears in both Theorems 2 and 3. Unlike the d/β bound
of Theorem 2, the threshold spread of (1− ǫ′) · βnβ+1 pre-
dicted by Theorem 2 is independent of d, and depends
only on λ and δ: the larger their value the larger the
spread. The independence from d is intuitively justi-
fied, because as soon as the the post reaches a “critical
mass” of users it will almost surely spread to a con-
stant fraction of the network. However, d determines
the probability with which such a critical mass will be
reached. For d close to the average number of followers,
this probability is at least some constant.
The proof of Theorem 3 uses a coupling between
the dissemination process and an appropriate branch-
ing process, to show that the probability of the event we
are interested in, that at least a certain fraction of users
receive the post, is lower-bounded by the survival prob-
ability of the branching process. Then we bound this
survival probability using a basic result for branching
processes. The proof can be found in the appendix.
5. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This section presents the experimental setup of Ri-
poste on real topologies from micro-blogging platforms
and social networks.
5.1 Data-sets
We use data-sets from several online services as the
underlying topology for our experiments.
Twitter is arguably the most popular micro-blogging
platform. We use a snapshot of the complete Twitter
network from 2009 containing 42 million users and 1.5
billion edges [14].
Facebook is the largest online social network, with
more than a billion active users. We use a sample of
Facebook from 2009 containing 3 million users and 28
million links [21].
Renren is an online social network similar to Facebook,
that is is popular in China. We use a sample of Ren-
ren from 2013 containing 1 million users and 57 million
links [5].
LiveJournal is a combination of a blogging service and
a social network. We use a sample of LiveJournal con-
taining 4.8 million users and 69 million edges.9
Google+ is another popular social network. We use a
sample containing 107 thousands users and 14 millions
edges.10
A summary of these topologies is given in Table 2.
Name # Users # Links Average #
Followers
Twitter 42M 1468M 35
Renren 1M 58M 58
LiveJournal 4.8M 69M 14
Facebook 3M 47M 16
Google+ 107K 14M 130
Table 2: Data-Sets characteristics
9http://snap.stanford.edu/data/soc-LiveJournal1.
html
10http://snap.stanford.edu/data/egonets-Gplus.html
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Figure 3: Spreading patterns under Riposte, DB-Riposte and Standard protocols (Uniform opinion model)
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Figure 4: Spreading patterns under Riposte, DB-Riposte and Standard protocols (Distance-threshold opinion
model)
5.2 User Opinion Model
While data on the topology of online services are
available, access to the history of users about the posts
they received or liked is severely restricted. Hence, we
rely on synthetic models to generate the users opin-
ions. We consider two user opinion models: the uniform
model and the distance-threshold model.
Uniform model. In this model, every user has the
same probability to like a given post. Precisely, each
post is assigned a popularity in [0, 1], which is the prob-
ability with which any user will like this post. Under
this model, the opinion of a user is independent of her
position in the network. This model is the same as the
one of Definition 2 on which our analysis of Riposte
in Section 4 is based.
Distance-threshold model. This model accounts for
the fact that in social networks, users are more likely
to be interested in the same posts when they are closer
to each other in the network. In the distance-threshold
opinion model, the opinion of a user about a post de-
pends on her shortest-path distance from the source of
the post. If this distance is below some threshold h,
which is a parameter of the model, the user likes the
post with probability 1, whereas if the distance is larger
than h then the user dislikes it with probability 1.
5.3 Evaluation metrics
We evaluate the dissemination properties of Riposte
along the following metrics:
Fraction of users that receiving the post. This
metric is the number of users who receive a post over
the total number of users.
Recall.
recall =
|users who like the post ∩ users who receive the post|
|users who like the post|
This metric measures how well the dissemination algo-
rithm is able to disseminate the post among users who
like it.
Precision.
precision =
|users who like the post ∩ users who receive the post|
|users who receive the post|
This is an indication of how many users receive posts
they are not interested in.
Spam rate.
spam =
|users who dislike the post ∩ users who receive the post|
|users who dislike the post|
5.4 Dissemination model
To evaluate the performances of Riposte, we sim-
ulate the dissemination of posts over several networks
we selected and with the two user opinion models. For
each simulation we select the source of the post at ran-
dom among the users having at least 30 followers (30 is
the average number of followers for different data-sets).
To start, we add all the followers of the source to a re-
ceivers list and then we iterate over each of the user in
this list. For each user, we decide if she likes the post
9
according the opinion model, and then if she forwards
the post to her followers according to the spreading al-
gorithm. If the post is forwarded to the user’s followers,
all the followers that receive the post for the first time
are added to the receivers list.
In addition to Riposte and DB-Riposte, we simu-
late the spreading with a third dissemination algorithm
that we call Standard. Standard is a non-privacy
preserving dissemination protocol that forwards with
probability 1 when the user likes the post, and with
probability 0 when the user dislikes the post (this is
equivalent to DB-Riposte with δ = 0 and λ = n where
n is the number of nodes in the network).
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our experimental evaluation shows that the dissem-
ination patterns generated by Riposte match the the-
oretical analysis.
6.1 Fraction of users receiving the post
Figure 5 displays the fraction of users who received
the disseminated posts withRiposte over different data-
sets. We see that Riposte behaves consistently with
different data-sets. The posts with a popularity smaller
than 0.2 never spread, while for the more popular posts
the spreading increases with the popularity.
For space reasons, we consider only three data-sets.
Given that Twitter, Facebook and Goggle+ have similar
results, we keep only Twitter which is the largest one.
Thus in the following we will only show the results for
Twitter, LiveJournal and Renren.
Figure 3 displays the average fraction of users who
received the posts in the considered data-sets under the
uniform opinion model, for various popularity values.
The straight line represents an ideal system, e.g., a post
liked by 40% of the users reach nearly 40% users on an
average.
We observe that the Standard algorithm is far from
achieving this objective and clearly over-disseminates
the posts. In particular, unpopular content is widely
disseminated, for instance posts with a popularity of
0.1 reaches over 50% of the network in Twitter and over
80% in Renren. On the contrary, Riposte achieves a
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Figure 5: Spreading patterns under Riposte, all data-
sets (Uniform opinion model)
dissemination much closer to the ideal one in all data-
sets and particularly in LiveJournal and Renren.
The popularity threshold p∗, introduced in Defini-
tion 3, is displayed in Figure 3 by a vertical line. The
experiments validate that, for both Riposte and DB-
Riposte, posts with popularity below threshold spread
to a very small fraction of users, whereas when popu-
larity grows above the threshold, the posts are dissem-
inated to a large fraction of the users.
Figure 4 presents the same experiments with the distance-
threshold model. As expected, we observe similar re-
sults as for uniform model. Not only Riposte en-
sures privacy, but the spreading achieved by the pro-
tocol matches the expected spreading and clearly out-
performs Standard in this respect.
6.2 Dissemination of unpopular posts
According to Theorem 2, the spreading of unpopular
posts is bounded by:
|users who like the post|
source degree
≤
1
β
=
1
(p∗ − p)× (λ− δ)
Figure 6 depicts the spreading of unpopular posts
achieved byRiposte andDB-Riposte when compared
to this theoretical bound. We observe that the experi-
ments match the analytical results: with both Riposte
and DB-Riposte the spreading of unpopular posts is
indeed lower than the theoretical bound.
6.3 Precision and recall of the spreading
We now do a qualitative evaluation of the spreading
by comparing the sets of users receiving the posts and
the sets of users interested in these posts.
Due to lack of space, we do not provide the results for
all data-sets but only for LiveJournal in Figure 7. For
this part of the evaluation we use only the distance-
threshold model as the uniform model is irrelevant in
this configuration.11
In Figure 7a we observe that the recall for the Stan-
dard protocol is always 1. This is because in the di-
stance-threshold model for every user who likes the post
there exists a path in the network between her and the
source of the post containing only users who like the
post. Thus, since in Standard the users always for-
ward posts they like, all the users liking the post end
up receiving it in the distance-threshold model. In con-
trast, since with Riposte, a posts is never reposted
with probability 1, the recall is always less than 1. How-
ever Riposte still spreads the interesting posts to a
very large fraction of the interested users (up to 80%)
while DB-Riposte achieves at best a recall of 35%.
11In the uniform model, the opinion of the user is indepen-
dent from her position in the network, thus the precision
depends only on the popularity of the post, and not on the
spreading algorithm
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In Figure 7b, we can see that Riposte achieves a bet-
ter precision than Standard. It may seem surprising
since because of the randomization performed by Ri-
poste, many users could repost the posts they do not
like which could strongly reduce the precision. However,
we can see that this does not happen as the precision of
Riposte is significantly larger than the one of Stan-
dard, especially for small values of h. We can draw
the same conclusion from Figure 7c as it shows that
Riposte spams spread much less than Standard.
6.4 Effect of λ and δ on spreading
In the experiments shown so far, we set the values
of λ and δ to values that match a level of privacy that
we believe is reasonable, with respect to the desired
dissemination. Now we evaluate the effect of varying
values of λ and δ on the dissemination. Results are
shown only for LiveJournal for space reasons. To isolate
the impact of each parameter, we first vary the value of
δ with λ = 3 and then vary the value of λ with δ set to
0.75. Results are reported in Figure 8a and Figure 8b
respectively. Figure 8a shows that varying the value of
δ has a strong impact on the popularity threshold after
which the posts start to spread, but has little effect on
the spread of posts with a popularity greater than 0.4.
Figure 8b, where the value of λ varies between 2 and
4, shows that λ strongly impacts both the popularity
threshold after which the posts starts to spread and the
number of users receiving the post.
7. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this section we discuss Riposte’s underlying im-
plementation issues and its interaction with the social
network or the micro-blogging platform.
As we have mentioned earlier, Riposte does not re-
quire any involvement from the server: it fits within the
user’s web browser. In this case, the randomization of
Riposte is done locally on the user’s machine, and the
only information accessible by the server is the output
of Riposte, i.e., the randomized decision. Thus the
users’ privacy is protected not only against an attacker,
but also against the service provider.
We should stress that Riposte diverges from the
standard repost practice: A user may not repost all
the content he would like to, and may repost content
he does not like. The goal of our protocol, however, is
to complement rather than replace the standard mech-
anism where each user reposts what he likes. Although
not addressed in this paper, it is possible to have a hy-
brid version of Riposte where a user can choose to
“force” a repost action on a specific post, if the user is
not concerned about revealing its opinion on that post.
However, we cannot allow a user to force that a post is
not reposted, otherwise Riposte’s privacy guarantees
no longer hold. Indeed, in that situation a user could
be convicted simply because she did not force the non-
reposting of a post, whatever her true opinion is. The
information of whether a repost was done by Riposte
or forced by the user can be communicated to the other
11
users. So, for example, a user may choose to ignore all
reposts that were not forced, in which case the hybrid
protocol behaves like a standard micro-blogging service.
However, for Riposte to achieve the desired dissemi-
nation, a user should always express her opinion for the
posts she receives. In order to achieve this, we propose
to display one post at a time to the user and let her
take a decision to either repost it or to move to another
post, which implicitly implies her decision not to repost
it. Another solution to deal with this is to impose a
time-out, after which the post cannot be disseminated
using Riposte.
8. RELATED WORK
Dwyer et al. [7] highlighted the weak privacy safe-
guards in micro-blogging and social-networking services.
Not surprisingly, a lot of work has been devoted to
the problem, including studies on how micro-blogging
and social network services fail to give complete privacy
guarantees to the user [23], characterization of privacy
threats to facilitate their intensive study [13], as well as
solutions dealing with individual threats [12, 19,24].
Anonymization (i.e., replacing names with meaning-
less unique identifiers [4]) is one of the most studied
privacy-preserving mechanisms for users in social net-
works, and for releasing data from these networks for
analysis and research. Anonymization does not always
suffice as the original data-sets can sometimes be recon-
structed [4,9,16]. K-anonymity, introduced in [20], pro-
tects tabular micro-data against linking attacks. The
concept has been extended for social network data-sets
in [25] . Clearly, there is an information loss that comes
with anonymization in social-networks and there is a
trade-off between the increased anonymity and the loss
of information as a result of anonymization [9].
The authors of [2] have recently proposed a system,
anonyLikes, that keeps the actual like count of a post
without revealing the names of the users who like it.
The adoption of pseudonyms has also been a common
practice by activists to hide their identity while con-
tributing to the spread of sensitive information [22].
This promises privacy to the user’s original identity at
the cost of the trust that their followers would put in
them should they knew the original identity of that user.
A similar issue concerns the hiding of IP addresses [17].
Riposte preserves the identity of the users while
providing privacy guarantees that can be quantified in
terms of differential privacy guarantees. Although there
has been a considerable work to bringing the concept of
differential-privacy to social-networks and micro-blogging
systems [10,11,18], to the best of our knowledge, our ap-
proach of disseminating information without anonymiz-
ing the users by giving differential privacy guarantees is
novel.
9. CONCLUSION
Privacy is becoming a prominent and continuously
raising concern in micro-blogging systems and is some-
what incompatible with the social nature of such plat-
forms, e.g., the identities of followers as well as the in-
formation they reposted is known. These systems ex-
pect the interesting content to spread and spam to die
quickly. In Riposte we take on this challenge and pro-
vide a privacy-preserving reposting protocol that en-
sures that an external attacker cannot tell with cer-
tainty whether a user contributed or not to the dis-
semination of some specific content. This is a powerful
property as social platforms play a major role in many
countries and may lead to actual arrests. Beyond pri-
vacy, Riposte also sustains the expected spreading pat-
terns of posts in a micro-blogging system by achieving a
wide spread dissemination of popular posts and limited
spread of unpopular posts.
Riposte achieves this trade-off between privacy and
dissemination by probabilistically switching the repost-
ing actions of a user. We quantify the privacy property
of Riposte analytically and provide bounds on the dis-
semination patterns. Our experimental results based
on a wide range of real topologies (Twitter, Google+,
Facebook, Renren and LiveJournal) show that the dis-
semination patterns indeed reflect the overall interests
of posts in the system. We believe that such a pro-
tocol could lead to novel kinds of privacy-preserving
micro-blogging platforms or be widely adopted by ex-
isting ones.
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APPENDIX
A. OMITTED PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Observation 1
If a user u likes the post it is reposted with prob-
ability rlike(d) by DB-Riposte, and with probability
rlike(s) by Riposte, where d is the total number of u’s
followers and s is the number of those followers that do
not know the rumor yet. Since s ≤ d it follows that
rlike(s) ≥ rlike(d), if s > 0. Similarly, if u does not
like the post it is reposted with probabilities rdis(s) and
rdis(d), respectively, and rdis(s) ≥ rdis(d). The claim
now follows by a standard coupling argument. Since
each user has the same opinion in both cases, we can
couple the random choices of the two protocols so that
DB-Riposte does a reposts from u only if Riposte
also reposts from u. This coupling ensures that the
set of users who receive the post when DB-Riposte is
used is a subset of those who receive the post with DB-
Riposte. This implies that Pr(N ≥ k) ≥ Pr(Ndb ≥ k),
for all k.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 for RIPOSTE
We consider the following representation of the ran-
dom process underlying the dissemination of the post.
At each point in time users are divided into three sets:
(1) the set D of those who have received the post and
either have reposted it, or it has been decided they will
not repost; (2) the set N of users who have received the
post but it has not yet been decided whether they will
repost or not; and (3) the set S of the remaining users,
who have not received the post yet.12 We assume that
dissemination proceeds in steps: At each step, a single
user u from set N is considered, and this user either re-
posts the post or it is decided to not repost. As a result,
u is moved from set N to set D, and if u reposts then all
its followers from set S are moved to N . The dissem-
ination is completed when the set N becomes empty.
For our analysis, the order in which the users from N
are considered can be arbitrary.
We denote byDt and Nt the values of the correspond-
ing sets defined above after the first t steps; we assume
that D0 contains just the source of the post, and N0
contains the d followers of the source.
Let nt = |Nt|. The total number T of users that
receive the post (excluding the source) is then
T = min{t : nt = 0}.
Suppose that t ≤ T (and thus nt−1 > 0), and consider
the expected change on nt in round t: If the user u con-
sidered in step t has s followers that have not received
the post yet, then the probability u reposts is
p · rlike(s) + (1− p) · rdis(s) ≤
pλ+ (1− p)δ
s
=
1− β
s
.
12The source user belongs to set D.
Thus, the expected number of new users that learn the
post at step t is at most 1−β, and the expected change
in nt is
E[nt − nt−1 | nt−1] ≤ (1− β)− 1 = −β, (5)
where the ‘−1’ in the middle expression accounts for
the removal of u from Nt−1.
It is now easy to understand the intuition behind the
bound we must show: At each step, nt drops in expec-
tation by at least β. If, instead, the actual drop were at
least β, then it would follow that the number of steps
until nt becomes zero would be at most n0/β = d/β,
which is equal to the bound we must show.
The formal proof is by a standard martingale argu-
ment. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , let Xt = nt + βt. Then for
0 < t ≤ T , we have Xt −Xt−1 = nt − nt−1 + β, and
E[Xt −Xt−1 | X0 . . . Xt−1]
= E[nt − nt−1 + β | X0 . . . Xt−1]
(5)
≤ 0.
Thus the sequenceX0, X1, . . . , XT is a super-martingale,
and T is a stopping time for this sequence. Since the
random variable T is bounded (it is at most equal to the
total number n − 1 of users, excluding the source), we
can apply the martingale stopping theorem to obtain
E[XT ] ≤ E[X0].
Substituting the values XT = nT +βT = βT , as nT = 0
by T ’s definition, and X0 = n0 = d, yields E[T ] ≤ d/β.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2 for Riposte.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We consider just DB-Riposte; the claim for Ri-
poste follows then from Remark 2.
The proof uses a standard coupling argument to show
that the probability of the event we are interested in,
that at least a certain fraction of users receive the post,
is lower-bounded by the survival probability of an ap-
propriate branching process. Then we bound this sur-
vival probability using a result for branching processes.
Recall that a (Galton-Watson) branching process is a
random process starting with one or more individuals,
and in each step of the process a single individual pro-
duces zero of more offsprings and then dies. The num-
ber of offsprings of an individual follows a fixed proba-
bility distribution that does not vary between individu-
als. The process either finishes after a finite number of
steps, when there are no individuals left, or continues
forever. The probabilities of these two complementary
events are called extinction and survival probability, re-
spectively.
We compare now the dissemination of a post in Gφ,
with a branching process we specify. First we compute
the distribution of the number of new users that learn
the post from a user u, at a point in time when fewer
than ℓ users have learned the post, for some ℓ to be
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exposed later. We have that the probability of u having
i followers is φ(i); and if u has i followers, then the
probability it reposts is (pλ + (1 − p)δ)/i = (β + 1)/i.
Further, if u decides to repost, we can assume that only
then its i followers are chosen, and that they are chosen
sequentially, one after the other. Then the probability
that the j-th follower of u does not already know the
post, and thus learns it from u, is at least 1 − ℓ/n,
provided that at most ℓ users already know the post
(including the first j−1 followers of u, and the source).
Consider now the branching process in which d indi-
viduals exist initially, and the number X of offsprings of
an individual is chosen as follows. First we choose some
integer i ≥ 0 from distribution φ. If i = 0 then X = 0.
If i > 0 instead, then with probability (β + 1)/i we let
again X = 0; while with the remaining probability, we
let X be a binomial random variable B(i, q), counting
the number of successes among i independent identical
trials with success probability q := 1− ℓ/n.
Consider now a coupling of the two processes above,
the dissemination process and the branching process,
until the earliest point in the dissemination process when
(at least) ℓ users have received the post, or the dis-
semination has finished. The coupling is such that the
number Nt of new users that learn the post in a step t
of the dissemination process is greater or equal to the
number Xt of offsprings produced in the corresponding
step of the branching process, for all steps t after which
the total number of users that have learned the post
is still smaller than ℓ. Such a coupling exists since, by
construction, Nt dominates stochastically Xt.
From the coupling above, the probability that at least
ℓ := (1 − ǫ′) · βn/(β + 1) users receive the post in to-
tal, is lower-bounded by the probability that the total
progeny of the branching process (i.e., the total number
of individuals that ever existed) is at least ℓ. Further,
the latter probability is lower bounded by the survival
probability of the branching process; we denote this by
ζd. Thus to prove the theorem it suffices to show that
ζd = 1− e
−Ω(d/µ).
We do so in the remainder of the proof.
By the definition of the branching process, the ex-
pected number of offsprings of an individual is
E[X] =
∑
i
φ(i) ·
β + 1
i
·E[B(i, q)] =
∑
i
φ(i)
β + 1
i
· iq
=
∑
i
φ(i) · (β + 1) · q = (β + 1) · q.
We observe that E[X] > 1, as
(β + 1) · q = (β + 1) ·
(
1−
(1− ǫ′)β
β + 1
)
= 1 + ǫ′β. (6)
Further, we have
E[X2] =
∑
i
φ(i) ·
β + 1
i
·E[(B(i, q))2]
=
∑
i
φ(i) ·
β + 1
i
· (i2q2 + iq(1− q))
=
∑
i
φ(i) · (β + 1) · (iq2 + q(1− q))
= (β + 1) · (µq2 + q(1− q)),
where µ =
∑
i φ(i) · i is the mean of φ. We will use the
following standard lower bound on the survival proba-
bility ζ1, when there is just one individual initially (see,
e.g., in [8, Section 5.6.1]),
ζ1 ≥
2(E[X]− 1)
E[X2]−E[X]
.
Substituting the values for E[X] and E[X2] computed
above yields
ζ1 ≥
2(q(β + 1)− 1)
(β + 1)(µq2 + q(1− q))− q(β + 1)
=
2(q(β + 1)− 1)
q2(β + 1)(µ− 1)
=
2(q(β + 1)− 1)(β + 1)
q2(β + 1)2(µ− 1)
(6)
=
2ǫ′β(β + 1)
(1 + ǫ′β)2(µ− 1)
= Ω(1/µ),
where the last equation holds because β = (p− p∗)(λ−
δ) ≥ ǫ(λ− δ) = Ω(1).
We can now express ζd in terms of ζ1, by observ-
ing that the branching process starting with d individ-
uals can be viewed as d independent branching pro-
cesses starting with a single individual each. The for-
mer branching process survives if and only if at least
one of the latter ones survives, thus,
ζd = 1− (1− ζ1)
d ≥ 1− eζ1d = 1− eΩ(d/µ).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
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